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This article argues that our view of citizens as miserably failing to maintain their role
in democracy is problematic, and that the problems stem from the “informed citizen”
ideal: it is too demanding, but also misses the target. The article proposes an alternative
normative concept for citizens’ public connection: distributed readiness citizenship. The
concept highlights how the state of being prepared to act is more important than levels of
measurable political knowledge. Readiness is crucial to finding enough information and
relevant cues, and it cannot be assessed based on individual citizens in isolation, but
should be considered as distributed, and embodied in citizens’ social networks, with a
division of labor. With such a conceptualization, we are better equipped to evaluate existing
conditions, judge the impact of populism and propaganda, and figure out how to improve
the chances for those less well-off to participate in democracy.
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Political populism is on the rise, and state-funded propaganda is finding new ways
to clutter the public sphere, mixing with highly personalized and commercialized
content in the digital media landscape. As a response, books have emerged that
advocate radical measures, such as withdrawing voting as a universal democratic
right (Brennan, 2016), or offer outright warnings of the death of democracy (Levitsky
& Ziblatt, 2018). At the center of the debate stands the citizen, seemingly outrageously
ignorant of current affairs, incapable of forming opinions on political issues, and
unwilling to act beyond immediate private concerns.
This article argues that such an assumption or view of the citizen is flawed. To
understand how current societal developments impact on democracy, and to start
systematically answering the question regarding what hinders those less well-off from
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participating more fully in democracy, we need to unpack the ideal upon which
we base our assessment: that of the informed citizen. The informed citizen is not
a stringent theoretical concept, but an ideal used explicitly and implicitly. It denotes a
citizen with time and interest in public life, gathering information on a wide range of
relevant policy issues in society. Leaving aside the unfeasibility of keeping abreast of
political problems across all domains, informed citizenship is not necessarily enough
to be capable of participating in democracy, and being informed is not necessarily
always required to participate.
Citizens’ dual role in democracy is to indicate which aims society should pursue,
and then to make sure the political system does its best in fulfilling those aims
(Christiano, 2015). Our task as communication scholars is to systematically get at
the structural features of a society that provides breeding grounds for populism and
effective propaganda, and lead some groups of people to struggle with fulfilling this
role. To embark on that task, we need an understanding of citizens’ relations to the
public realm that (a) identifies the crucial components that citizens need for their
dual role in democracy; (b) balances a critical approach with feasibility and attention
to context; and (c) understands citizens’ media use as one of several ways to connect
to the public.
Inspired by the “realist turn” in political theory and discussions of normative
requirements, I will identify two problems with holding and potentially acting out of
the ideal of the informed citizen. As pointed out by political communication scholars
such as John Zaller (2003) and Doris Graber (2003), it is too demanding. But I
will argue that, in addition, the informed ideal also misses its target. It is not just
unfeasible, it is also undesirable. Information is important, but not the determining
factor that we should highlight in a normative ideal. On this basis, I suggest we
should let a different norm guide our assessments of citizens’ relations to the public
realm, and to that end, I introduce the concept of distributed readiness citizenship.
Distributed readiness citizenship is not a general theory of citizenship, but a concept
referring to citizens’ orientations to a sphere of politics in the wide sense: their
public connection (Couldry, Livingstone, & Markham, 2007). Distributed readiness
citizenship describes the capabilities citizens need in order to partake in society.
These capabilities are hard to strive for, yet obtainable, and they redirect our attention
to pertinent problems with actual, existing democracies. I build on economics and
studies of voter behavior (Downs, 1957), as well as political history and journalism
research that trades “informed” for “monitorial” (Schudson, 1998), but I develop a
normative position that contributes an understanding of how social relations matter
in media-saturated everyday life. I highlight this point through the insistence on
distribution.
In what follows, I first describe the status of the informed citizen ideal in demo-
cratic theory and in the field of communication studies. I then present the first
problem—being too demanding—through a discussion of realism in normative
theory. I argue that a certain level of “thickness” through context awareness and
attention to historical facts is important when developing a normative concept to
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guide our study of where citizens fail to maintain their role in democracy. Having
established a fruitful normative level, I turn to discuss the second problem with the
informed citizen ideal, which is that it fails to describe a crucial component of citizens’
public connection. I then identify more relevant components of the kind of practice
that would serve the citizens. On this basis, I suggest distributed readiness citizenship
as a concept that captures the normative expectations we should direct at citizens.
Distributed readiness citizenship highlights how, although information is needed, the
state of being prepared to act is more important to consider when assessing citizens’
relations to the public than levels of “informedness.” Readiness refers to the crucial
state of being able and willing to find enough relevant information and use cues to
inform behavior; it cannot be judged based on individual citizens in isolation, but as
embodied in citizens’ social networks. In closing, I point to implications and address
a potential pitfall: tasks can be distributed, but the rights to information, free speech,
or voting cannot. Distributed readiness citizenship is not an excuse for accepting
inequality and asymmetric power relations among the public. Rather, it calls for
attention to those with weak public connections.
The informed citizenship ideal and its two problems
When communication scholars engage with conceptualizations of the citizen’s public
connection or the way one orients oneself to a public sphere, we tend to focus on
differences between models. The basic division—invoked, for example, by Habermas
in his work from the 1990s—is between the republican and the liberal models (Ferree,
Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Habermas, 1996). The former aims for maximum
participation. Citizens should partake actively in the running of society through
acquiring knowledge, expressing views, listening to others, entering discussions,
and helping to find and implement solutions. The latter, liberal model requires a
bare minimum of the citizen: in some versions it is enough to privately show a
preference in the booth each time an election is called. Deliberative democracy is
routinely portrayed as an amalgam of these two, insofar as it affords maximum public
participation but introduces procedures to secure an output that can lead to better
governance within formal institutions.
Despite holding diverging understandings of democracy, proponents of the liberal,
republican, and deliberative models agree on one thing: citizens should be informed.
To consider candidates for election based on their individual merits, citizens have
to be informed about the candidates’ positions and opinions (for a detailed dis-
cussion, see Strömbäck, 2005). And, for republicans and proponents of deliberative
democracy, being part of an ongoing public discourse among citizens aiming to
decide the direction of society likewise requires being informed. Deliberative systems
theory, which has formed a focal point for the most recent debates on deliberation
and democracy, shows great concern for citizens’ participation, but even here, the
foundation—even for the least demanding versions—is also an informed citizenry
(for a review, see Owen & Smith, 2015). Fresh, complex theoretical constructs
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from the field of communication studies, which build nuanced models for citizen-
public relations, operate under the same basic assumption. A case in point is Peter
Dahlgren’s (2015) version of “civic culture” as an “integrated circuit of six dimensions
of mutual reciprocity,” in which knowledge is the first dimension, with the media
playing “a key role.” As Scott Althaus (2006) convincingly argued, while you will not
find a naive idea of all citizens as fully informed in any democratic theory, the focus
on information and the norm of “the more informed, the better” remain widespread.
This idea that being informed is a crucial aspect of being a citizen, and that the
media play a crucial role in this, is also deeply ingrained in policy, as well as in
journalism’s self-understanding. A recent report on media pluralism in 30 European
countries, for instance, stated that:
Free media and the plurality of voices constitute the foundations of any healthy
democratic society: they are indispensable conditions with which to guarantee
that individuals have access to a variety of information and may form their
opinions by taking into account different perspectives and views. (Brogi, Bania,
Nenadic, Ostling, & Parcu, 2017, p. 2)
To the extent that policy documents provide the rationale for free speech and media
regulations, similar formulations abound. Commentators in the press also regularly
refer to the ideal of the informed citizen (e.g., see Lupia, 2016). In one sense, this
is uncontroversial: independent journalism and media pluralism are resources for a
well-functioning democracy. Yet, such formulations also build on a rather simplistic
idea that access to a plurality of voices and content in the media leads to individually
informed citizens.
A related belief can be found in communication research. Journalism studies
regularly assume that journalists are important in serving people when they act as
citizens (e.g. Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009, for an overview of positions). And
as Chadwick, Vaccari, and O’Loughlin (2018, p. 2) argued, “almost all theoretical
perspectives on political communication rest on an ideal of the behaviors and con-
textual conditions that shape good citizenship,” which includes that citizens should
“learn about the social and political world,” for which news is a “key circulatory raw
material.”
The informed ideal is explicit in much empirical political communication research
through the use of political knowledge questions in surveys. The basic assumption
is that political knowledge—"the range of factual information about politics that
is stored in long-term memory” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 10)—is key to
people as citizens, and is possible to measure. Communication scholars use that
approach to estimate degrees of being informed, arguing that it matters for political
engagement, and that the success or failure of journalism can be assessed through
correlations between media use and the recall of certain facts about political issues.
To measure differences among citizens, the impact of journalism, and people’s
political engagement, scholars typically quiz informants about recent events, or check
their understanding of the political system (for a sound recent example, see Gil
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de Zúñiga, Weeks, & Ardèvol-Abreu, 2017). Twenty years ago, Arthur Lupia and
Mathew McCubbins (1998, p. 3) summed up studies of voter behavior by quoting
Cicero: “in the common people there is no wisdom, no penetration, no power of
judgement.” The two decades that have passed have brought more of the same:
increasingly sophisticated discussions on how to best measure political knowledge
(Barabas, Jeri, Pollock & Rainey, 2014), and studies that show big discrepancies
between the normative expectations of informed citizens and their practices (Lupia,
2016; Rapeli, 2014).
While some (Brennan, 2016; Luskin, 2002) have used such findings to scorn
citizens, others have used them to offer more nuanced discussions. A recent compre-
hensive review by Van Aelst et al. (2017) is a case in point. They hold that changing
“political information environments” have consequences for “the extent to which they
aid people in becoming informed citizens” (Van Aelst et al., 2017, p. 3). Though the
authors were careful to underline the fact that political information environments
include different sources and actors, they focused on political news, and the research
they reviewed that looked at the demand side of this equation measured levels of
political knowledge. Van Aelst et al. (2017, p. 5) referred to work that supports the
claim that “well-informed citizens are better able to link their interest with their
attitudes, choose political representatives who are consistent with their own attitudes,
and participate in politics.” Based on their extensive review, they concluded that
“there are strong reasons to be concerned about increasing inequalities in media
use and knowledge about politics and public affairs” (Van Aelst et al., 2017, p. 18).
These are important findings. Citizens need information to maintain their role in
democracy, and research that maps and explains the disparities in the distribution
of such information is clearly valuable. Yet, building on earlier contributions that
have questioned the usefulness of the informed ideal (e.g. Althaus, 2006; Druckman,
2014), I suggest a different approach. I will leave aside the methodological problems
with measuring political knowledge (e.g., see Graber, 2004; Page & Shapiro, 1992),
and argue that the very idea of using political knowledge as an indicator of citizens’
public connection is undesirable.
Political information and news are important, but not primarily because they ren-
der citizens generally informed. Rather than keep on blaming democracy’s problems
on citizens’ failure to live up to the ideal, or strive to adjust political information
environments to improve more people’s chances to get closer to the informed ideal,
I want to suggest that we should reconsider the norm. There are, I will argue, two
problems with the informed citizen as an ideal. It is too demanding, and also misses
the target. The first problem is the obvious one: no citizen can be expected to be
informed on all the issues on the political agenda in any modern society. This is not
to dismiss the use of normative concepts for empirical studies, but to argue that the
ideal of the informed citizen is too far removed from the experiences of most people,
and biased to a certain form of orientation (Ytre-Arne and Moe, 2018). The second
problem with the ideal is not the perceived distance from experienced reality, but
the fact that it misses the target: being informed is not essential for citizens’ role in
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democracy, but also not necessarily enough. I will argue that being informed, then, is
not the crucial component of a normative citizenship concept. The next two sections
will delve into these two problems.
Too demanding: How to develop a realistic normative ideal
The problem with the informed citizen ideal being too far removed from empirical
reality and too demanding for the citizen points to a basic question in normative
theory: how do we develop a useful normative concept? Before we can carve out
a feasible norm for citizens to strive for when partaking in democracy, we need to
discuss how such a norm should be built.
John Rawls’ (2001) influential theory of justice, which he developed over several
decades, resulted in a great deal of productive friction in political theory. For Rawls,
an ideal theory—where one assumes full cooperation from all actors and favorable
social conditions—is required as a tool to “yield a systematic understanding of how
to reform our non-ideal world” (Wenar, 2017, para. 2.3). The informed citizen could
make sense as a concept of ideal theory. In a hypothetical situation where everyone
complies with the chosen laws and principles, and where social conditions facilitate
people to live up to those principles, being informed could perhaps seem like an
achievable task. The critique levelled at ideal theory, though, argues that the approach
is not that fruitful.
Such critiques are sometimes lumped together under the rubric of “non-ideal
theory,” which starts from a representation of a phenomenon’s essential nature and
basic dynamics. From such a position, one would argue that in cases where most
instances of the phenomenon are quite different from an idealized ideal, it is easier
to “identify and understand the peculiar features that explain [the phenomenon’s]
dynamic and prevent it from attaining ideality” (Mills, 2005, p. 167) if we work from
the non-ideal abstraction of actually existing instances. Non-ideal theory is about the
gaps “between what we ought to aim for and what we can do” (Frazer, 2010, p. 498). In
communication studies, Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach is one example of how
the cues from non-ideal theory have been mobilized (e.g. Coleman & Moss, 2015).
Portrayed as a countermovement to the “reign” of high liberalism (Galston, 2010,
p. 385), with Bernard Williams (2005) and Raymond Geuss (2008) as much-quoted
thinkers, democratic realism is a label used on a different critique of ideal theory.
While some non-ideal theory proponents argue for lowering the bar of what we
can expect to make the norms more useful as regulatory devices, realists offer a
more substantial critique (Hall, 2017; Sleat, 2016). With a lineage from Hobbes,
democratic realism is explicitly anti-utopian. The first virtue of politics is not justice,
but order, and “preventing the worst is the first duty of political leaders” (Galston,
2010, p. 394). This does not imply a knee-jerk defense of the status quo in politics.
Rather, realists claim an interest in an “empirically informed critique of social and
political phenomena” (Prinz & Rossi, 2017, p. 348), and have explicit normative
ambitions. A basic difference between realism and ideal theory is the insistence on
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starting from historically and politically sensitive judgments when building norma-
tive concepts (Hall, 2017). For instance, if we want to understand privacy issues
in the data age, we should not merely check social media user practices against a
static concept of privacy, but recognize how new technologies, social media use,
and surveillance experiences change our understanding of privacy itself, and then
look at the political consequences (Hall, 2017). Williams (2005, p. 49) invited us to
explore the balance between “thin” concepts, which offer abstract and procedural
considerations removed from people’s everyday lives, and “thick” concepts, which
are substantive and more easily related to a specific “ethical constituency.” The aim
should be to balance a critical stance with “realizability” and the engagement with
empirical research (Nielsen, 2017), and thus retain a normative potential.
Democratic realism claims a fundamentally different approach to understanding
politics and democracy, compared to the Rawlsian high liberalism. This claim is
disputed (Maynard & Worsnip, 2018). Yet, on the issue of normativity, democratic
realism resonates with other, seemingly incompatible traditions in political theory.
Michael Walzer (1993), for instance, developed a kind of communitarian immanent
critique as a form of social activity performed from within, based on standards
shared in the community. Grounding theory in the empirical has also been important
to scholars such as Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, albeit on a macro level.
For Honneth, who built his approach on Habermas’, normative reconstruction is “a
procedure that aims to develop normative theory by identifying and reworking the
norms and ideals already inherent in modern institutions, and then evaluating them
through normative comparison” (Karppinen, 2018, p. 75). A genealogical method
is needed to make sure that the normative potential found in social, economic, and
political practices and institutions has not changed, argued Honneth (Pedersen, 2012;
Pedersen also examines differences between Habermas and Honneth on this issue).
Such an insistence on the empirical—grounding a normative concept in an anal-
ysis of actual practices—can also be found elsewhere in political theory. In a recent
contribution to deliberative democratic systems theory, David Owen and Graham
Smith (2015, p. 232) proposed a systemic formulation which “directs us to the
comparative project of working through the roles and sites of democratic deliberation
in different democratic systems, that is, to building normative democratic theory in
close relation to comparative analysis of democratic practice.” The call for context-
aware developments of normative concepts, then, is not unique for democratic
realism. These examples illustrate how “political theories can be seen as more or
less realistic along a continuum” and that “whether a normative political theory is
sufficiently ‘fact-sensitive/realistic’ or not depends on its intended aim and question”
(Valentini, 2012, p. 660).
While it might not always be stringently formulated based on ideal theory, the
informed citizen model is less useful if we want to understand the conditions a
citizenry lives under, and then improve their possibilities to undertake the important
work needed for democracy to function. Following Laura Valentini (2012, p. 660), if
“we wish to design prescriptions that are likely to be effective, given some common
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flaws in human behaviour, then we better factor in more real-world constraints.”
This explains why being informed is a less useful norm to operate under when the
goal is to find the obstacles that prevent those less well-off from participating in
society. As a normative ideal, the informed citizen is too ignorant of historical context
and actual existing conditions and, therefore, too demanding. By considering real-
world constrictions, we prescribe a procedure for rethinking the crucial component
of citizens’ relations to the public.
Missing the target: Identifying the crucial component of citizens’ public
connection
The procedure towards a realistic, normative concept of citizens’ relations to the
public realm, then, should pay due attention to facts, and to social realities. If we
do that, it also becomes clear how the informed ideal misses its target. Two quite
different disciplines can shed light on why this is so.
A first inroad to the reason why the informed ideal fails in describing a crucial
component for citizens can be found in the discipline of political history: specifically,
in the work of Michael Schudson (1998, 2000). Based on the US case, his research
convincingly showed how, historically, different versions of democracy have come
with different concepts of what a citizen is. Accordingly, the reform movement in the
late–19th century United States brought a shift from a trust-based citizen concept
to the informed citizen concept, requiring a citizen to become capable of assessing
candidates for election based on their individual qualities. For Schudson (2000,
p. 16), the 1900s brought forth the monitorial citizen: a citizen “informed enough
and alert enough.” While the informed citizen gathers information, the monitorial
citizen supervises, and can multitask while being watchful (Schudson, 1998). As a
consequence, the public connection is maintained while attending to other tasks.
The monitorial concept has been used by a range of scholars: for example, to
develop a new “burglar alarm” standard for journalism (Zaller, 2003); to survey
citizens’ political interest, efficacy, action, and channels for participation (Hooghe &
Dejaeghere, 2007); to analyze young people’s modes of political engagement (Hustinx,
Meijs, Handy, & Cnaan, 2012); to study different uses of news in a digital media
landscape (Meijer & Kormelink, 2015; Ytre-Arne & Moe, 2018); and to describe an
altogether new phase of democracy (Keane, 2009). While such contributions vary in
their specific use of the term “monitorial,” a common denominator is the exploration
of citizens’ relations to the public in today’s Western societies. The crucial component
this body of work points to is, as opposed to being generally informed, a form of
surveillance, of standing by, with the ability to act when needed.
Schudson (2000) neither thought of the monitorial citizen as a substitute for
previous citizen concepts, nor as a “laid back” model with no normative potential (for
a criticism, see Bennett, 2003). On the contrary, he argued that it was, in some ways,
more demanding, given that “one’s peripheral vision should always have a political
or civic dimension” (Schudson, 2000, p. 16). In sum, along with diverse empirical
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studies, including of news consumption, the argument, based on the historical
analysis of political communication and political life, proposes that in our societies,
being monitorial could be a more apt norm for citizens when performing their role
in democracy.
The second perspective that is helpful in explaining the problem with the informed
ideal missing its target comes from economics, particularly Anthony Downs’ (1957)
theory of democracy (cf. Zaller, 2003). Like scholars such as Berelson, Lazarsfeld
and McPhee (1954), Downs was interested in how people could make choices with
limited information. He explained how we rely on cues or information shortcuts
in all domains, including the political. In the language of rational choice, a person
is inclined to transfer the cost of gathering, selecting, transmitting, analyzing, and
evaluating data for political information to others, be they news media, political
parties, interest groups, experts, or other citizens (Downs, 1957). For Downs, this
is not merely an observable fact of life, but a necessity in complex societies. Without
such an extensive use of shortcuts, democracy would fail in an instant.
Political scientists and economists build on such ideas when they study rational
ignorance. Some studies tend to be critical of citizens’ lack of abilities to form opinions
and act responsibly (e.g. Caplan, 2007), or show how many citizens today base their
decisions on social loyalties (Achen & Bartels, 2016). These discussions are founded
on a more or less explicit normative ideal with clear connections to the informed
citizen. Others have argued that we should judge the public’s rationality as a collective
(Page & Shapiro, 1992). Political psychology has shown how political judgments
can be made based on already “stored” evaluations, freeing citizens from getting
specific, new information: a distinction between so-called “on-line” and “memory-
based” political information processing (Sullivan, Rahn & Rudolph, 2002, p. 38).
Such studies have led some to argue that “information holding is but one standard
of good citizenship and not necessarily an appropriate or important one” (Lodge,
Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995, p. 322). Yet others have tried to study when and how
people make use of cues or information shortcuts, and when such shortcuts are useful
substitutes for information (Graber, 2004). There are problems with such heuristics:
for example, they seem to work better for certain groups of the population, and are
prone to manipulation (for recent overviews, see Lupia, 2016; Lupia & McCubbins,
1998). Though there is disagreement on the value of information shortcuts, they are
a fact of human life, and central for people’s orientation towards the public realm.
Rather than condemning the use of cues, we should think about how to build a
normative ideal on that basis.
Political philosophers, such as Thomas Christiano (1996, 2015), offer such a
contribution. For Christiano (2015, p. 258 ), “the expectation that every citizen
should be informed in a way that is independent of how others are informed” is an
ideal “spectacularly irrelevant for all societies that have moved beyond the hunter-
gatherer stage.” In fact, “most of us are downright stupid when it comes to most
of the conditions on which our lives depend” (Christiano, 2015, p. 257). Whether
it is the choice of toothpaste, the effects of medical treatments, or the structure
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of banks’ personal saving products, we know little to nothing. People can have an
informed opinion without being able to justify their beliefs, he argues, since they
depend on others’ judgments. Christiano (2015) calls this an external standard of
well-groundedness.
In political science literature, such a division of labor is sometimes conceived as
separations into issue publics (e.g. Berelson et al., 1954), with critical discussions
about the problems they entail, especially if the division goes too far and results
in solid, rather than porous, borders between such publics (a concern also found,
for example, in normative deliberative democratic theory). The role of experts, as
another aspect of an intellectual division of labor, faces similar criticism. There is,
however, a tendency that such criticism, after rightfully establishing that neither
information shortcuts nor issue publics and the use of experts provides an easy fix,
dismisses these mechanisms altogether (for a case in point, see Somin, 2016). This is
unproductive.
Experts, for instance, can be seen not just as a threat to democracy, but as key
actors in a political process led by reason. Acknowledging that people rely on others’
expertise on a given topic leads to discussions of how to best facilitate a division
of labor, to set up an “epistocracy by democratic delegation” (Holst & Molander,
2019, p. 7). The crucial aspect, then, is the resources a citizen has at her disposal
for the external grounding of beliefs: the information environment, which consists of
a range of media and providers, but also the social network she can mobilize, which
could include civil society or interest groups, political organizations, family, friends,
colleagues, and experts of different kinds. From this perspective, the individual’s own
levels of accumulated information that can be recalled on a given topic is not the
determining factor. What the normative discussion, based on economists’ studies of
voter behavior offers, then, is a shift of focus from each citizen’s isolated, extensive
information gathering to uses of information shortcuts in a social network. As a
result, being an informed citizen seems less important as an ideal.
Both of the two paths discussed here lead to a realization that being informed is an
unlikely candidate for a crucial component of citizenship. Schudson’s (1998) political
history stresses a form of monitoring, requiring from individuals a low-level, but
always-on, attention towards the public realm. The perspective offered by Christiano
(2015) adds an insistence on the division of labor, steering us clear of atomic thinking
by underlining the social aspect of citizenship. Taken together, we see the following
elements emerging as more important for the citizens’ public connection: a person’s
alertness, being ready to act with a basis in a previously developed platform, with a
social network that makes up the nodes and links needed to execute the action when
required. If this is to serve as a basis for a normative concept, the question is, what
place there is for mediated communication?
The role of mediated communication
It should come as no surprise to communication scholars that the contributions
mobilized in this discussion so far had little to say about the media. Downs (1957) did
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count journalistic media as a relevant actor for peoples’ information gathering, but
he arguably paid more attention to political parties, lobbyists, and fellow citizens. The
research on voter behavior in political science followed suit, typically noting the press
as a factor, but without digging into specifics (e.g., Lupia, 2016; Lupia & McCubbins,
1998). Political philosophers also have less to say about the workings of the media
sector, and the role of mediated communication more broadly, than about in-person
deliberations or mechanisms to push concerns from citizens toward the centers of
power in a society. Deliberative system theorists refer to this mechanism as “trans-
mission” (e.g., Boswell, Hendriks, & Ercan, 2016): a term which, at best, connotes a
simplistic idea of how communication works in real social settings. And in recent
discussions of how to balance the democratic aim of equal participation with the
epistemic quality of discussions and decisions, the role of mediated communication
has either been limited to the journalistic press, with attention given to journalist-
source relations (e.g., Chambers, 2017), or abstracted away in an exchange of general
discussions of public space (Erman, 2016).
The problem here is not so much a lack of acknowledgment of the importance of
the media in and for democracies, but the lack of nuanced understandings of what
“the media” means for citizens today. This is also a challenge for Schudson’s (1998)
work on monitorial citizenship, by now two decades old. For people in the affluent
parts of the world, the media encompasses not only the institutions of the mass media,
but also new and less institutionalized actors, ranging from YouTube, blogs, and so-
called alternative media to peers and random individuals. The divisions between
different distribution technologies make less and less sense as Internet protocols
become the favored mode for sending information, and this entanglement persists
as the small computers we still call phones facilitate cross-media use everywhere
and anytime. As audience researchers have argued, media has become “increasingly
ubiquitous, intrusive and hyper-connected” (Ytre-Arne & Das, 2018, p. 547). There
is a need to disentangle.
In terms of news use, research has shown how social media can help expose
people to news, and how those who are incidentally exposed to news in social media
seem to rely on more sources than average (for a comparison of Italy, Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, see Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017), but has also
shown that such news reading is more fragmented and spread out through the day
(on Argentina, see Boczkowski, Mitchelstein, & Matassi, 2018). The mobile phone
is central here, as a form of meta-medium used to micro-organize everyday lives
(on Denmark, see Thorhauge, 2016), sometimes disrupting the flow of other tasks
(Ytre-Arne, Karlsen, Moe, & Syvertsen, 2018), but also being used for news: for
some as an addition to traditional providers and for others as a new entry point to
information about society (e.g., on Flanders, see Van Damme, Courtois, & Verbrugge,
2015). A further contribution to the disentangling can be found in studies of how
fictional media content may, depending on advantageous combinations of media
repertoires and socio-economic background resources, provide audiences with a
connection to the sphere of politics (on Norway, see Nærland, 2018). Researchers
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with an interest in social class have also shown how news consumption differs
depending on such background variables (on Sweden, see Lindell, 2018). Moreover,
practices sometimes discussed under the heading of “media literacy,” such as Internet
search practices (on the United Kingdom, see Davies, 2017) or Internet skills more
generally (on older US adults, see Hargittai, Piper, & Morris, 2018), show robust
inequalities along the same kind of variables.
The point here is not to offer a comprehensive review of what we know about media
use as concerning public connection, but to underline the importance of doing spe-
cific, empirical work to figure out how different forms of mediated communication
matter for citizens in different settings. Equally important, however, is to maintain a
certain sobriety regarding the centrality of the media for citizens’ public connections
(Livingstone, 2018).
Mediated communication—for example, through social networking sites—does
permeate civil society, workplaces, and peoples’ engagement with each other in
private settings. At the same time, the family dinner, the lunch break at work, the
local sports team, and the community initiative still represent arenas for citizens
to connect with the public (e.g., on civil society groups, see Eimhjellen, 2014; on
infrequent users of conventional news, see Toff & Nielsen, 2018). Schudson (2000,
p. 17) saw the press as a tool, not as the “the focal point,” of civic life. That still holds
today for the media more broadly. Scrutiny of the media is important if we want to
grasp the structural challenges for citizens’ democratic participation, but we cannot
limit our analysis to practices where media appears central. A normative concept of
citizens’ relations to the public realm, then, needs to acknowledge how journalistic
media constitutes but one aspect of the ubiquity of mediated communication, and
that mobile and social media potentially extend existing nodes and create new nodes
in peoples’ social networks, which are important for their public connection.
Distributed readiness citizenship
The insights from the clarification of the two problems with the informed citizen
ideal, and the discussion of the role of mediated communication, can now be brought
together in a formulation of a realistic, normative concept.
The crucial component of citizens’ public connection is neither being informed,
nor monitoring. What we need is a term that is less, but simultaneously more,
demanding. It can be less demanding concerning the general level of individual
attention needed to maintain an overview of multiple domains. The term also has to
shift our focus from the very act of monitoring, towards the more substantial qualities
and capabilities needed, and in that way should end up being more demanding. The
German term Bereitschaft covers these objectives. In English, Bereitschaft is translated
as preparedness or readiness: the condition of being ready; the state of being prepared.
You reach readiness through planning, training, outfitting, and experience. Readiness
needs to be maintained, but once it reaches a certain level, one can be called upon
to respond effectively to the condition in question. In daily use, such terms are
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linked to governmental organizations and to sudden events. Bereitschaftspolitzei is the
German riot police, and Ready, the US public service campaign that promotes, among
other initiatives, “National Preparedness Month,” aims to “educate and empower the
American people to prepare for, respond to and mitigate emergencies” (Ready, 2018).
In the United States, “preppers” is used as derogatory slang to describe survivalists,
who form a loosely organized movement actively planning for emergencies, typically
involving a disruption in the social and political order. Globally, war, terrorist threats,
and extreme weather conditions strengthen the attention given to such initiatives and
movements.
It is not the intention to align citizens’ everyday role in the running of democracies
with that of planning for a catastrophe. By evoking readiness to describe the crucial
competence a citizen needs to partake in the rule of democratic society, I emphasize
a use of the term that highlights a set of abilities and resources required for the task
ahead, whether or not that task is connected to an abrupt external event or a slowly
progressing shift in conditions. Readiness is needed in all sorts of everyday encoun-
ters and actions. This understanding is akin to the use of readiness in psychology to
describe or measure the condition of being able to learn: for example, the readiness
in the stage of a child’s maturity to learn something new. Readiness citizenship
relieves the citizen of a requirement to be informed of all relevant current issues,
but it also mitigates the individual’s responsibility to monitor. Readiness includes an
alertness directed to the public, but encompasses more: being ready means having
access to certain resources; having practiced, been close to the action, or previously
participated under similar conditions; and having acquired knowledge or experience.
Readiness is characterized by flexibility; it means being equipped to act when needed:
to organize and to adapt.
In this understanding, readiness has some tangential points with other concepts. It
covers some of the requirements identified in interpretations of Schudson’s monito-
rial concept (e.g. Hooghe & Dejaeghere, 2007): it requires a basic interest in politics
and efficacy, while highlighting the importance of these aspects beyond—or prior
to—the information gathering and the monitoring. Further, there is a similarity to
what is sometimes referred to as “political literacy,” though that term is linked to US
educational policy discussions (e.g. Cassel & Lo, 1997). Other neighboring terms,
such as “political awareness” (Zaller, 1992), still maintain a focus on the degree
of attention, similar to the idea of the monitorial citizen. As for the scholars who
explicitly lower the bar and argue that the “fully informed voter” is harmful, such as
Lupia (2016, p. 256), there is still a focus on the information that builds knowledge,
which can be mobilized as a competence for the citizen. That leads, for instance,
to a discussion of how to adjust surveys to better measure respondents’ political
knowledge (Lupia, 2016). My argument is more radical, in the sense that it suggests
we should shift attention from informational levels to readiness in a broader sense,
not because information is not an important prerequisite, but because taking the
informed citizen ideal for granted hinders us from seeing other, crucial components
of citizens’ relations to the public.
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In addition to evoking readiness to grasp the characteristics of desirable citizen
behavior, my proposition also differs in highlighting our social networks. Readiness
must be distributed, which will help dispel any potential visions of a lone hoarder of
canned food in a shelter in the woods. Not everyone needs to be individually ready
for each hypothetical political development, shift in policies, or political scandal. The
responsibility has to be distributed across the network, following the logic of division
of labor between people with more or less expertise in different topics and varying
degrees of interest in certain issues and developments. As argued by Christiano (2015,
p. 260):
As long as there are enough people monitoring the situation who can sound the
alarm if there is a problem, and as long as there are enough people who can hear
the alarm, most people will benefit from using the shortcut of assuming that if
there is no audible alarm, there is no problem.
There are clear echoes of Schudson’s (1998) “monitorial citizen” here, as well as of
Zaller’s (2003) “burglar alarm standard for news,” but emphasizing the social aspect
of everyday life adds feasibility and specifies how an alarm system might function in
a complex democracy. Every citizen does not have to listen actively for every possible
alarm to go off, as long as someone does, and reports it. In essence, this entails a
distribution of the burden of citizenship. The task of staying “informed enough,” or
the preparedness needed to enable springing into action when that is called for, is
delegated among the nodes in a citizen’s social network. It would be wrong to call this
a lowering of expectations, though, since the task of being ready and the distribution
of alertness require each citizen to develop competences and, more or less, take their
turn in the monitoring of specific issues.
Mediated communication has to be an integrated tool for distributed readiness
citizenship. A citizen’s network will clearly profit from stable, independent, quality
news provision, as well as access to social networking sites and online resources for
information. Exactly to what extent different groups of citizens use such different
tools, and which specific kind of news provision reaches who, is an empirical
question. The notion of distributed readiness citizenship can guide our analysis of
mediated communication when we strive to figure out exactly how the readiness is
distributed.
Implications and conclusion
Focusing on citizens’ relations to the sphere of politics—their public connection—
this article has discussed how the norm we rely on, implicitly and explicitly, fails
in various ways to serve its purpose. The aim has been to raise awareness of how
the scope and limits of theoretical concepts have consequences for our assessments.
I identified two problems with using the informed citizen as a guide for empirical
studies, and for evaluations of existing conditions: it demands too much, and it does
not describe a crucial practice for citizens. Based on contributions from political
theory and pursuing a more realist approach but retaining a normative potential,
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I have argued that a historical analysis, awareness of specific cultural and social
settings, and fact sensitivity are required. The aim is a “thicker” concept, trading some
universalism for feasibility.
I have argued that “readiness” is a better candidate than “informed” as the key
phrase, but that the citizen’s task needs to be understood in accordance with an
intellectual division of labor, steering clear of atomistic thinking, and acknowledging
the social reality of everyday life. The argument is not that information is unimpor-
tant, but that the often implicit ideal of the informed citizen makes us ignore other,
central competences for citizenship. Critiquing a lack of nuanced attention to the
role of mediated communication in previous theorizations, I have underlined how
journalistic media is an important part of people’s public connections, but still just
one part. On this basis, I have proposed distributed readiness citizenship as a concept
that can guide our analysis: realistic and normative, situating citizens in their social
world, and grasping the pervasive media environments of today’s societies.
Introducing the distribution of tasks might lead some to also consider the dis-
tribution of rights. This would be in direct opposition to fundamental democratic
ideas. While the expectations regarding people’s orientation towards politics should
be changed, and while we need to acknowledge a division of labor that builds their
public connection, all citizens should have equal democratic rights. Rather than
paving the way for elites to manipulate the general public, distributed readiness
citizenship invites us to realistically engage with the actually existing mechanisms
citizens use—informational shortcuts, divisions into issue publics—to figure out how
such mechanisms can work better for more members of the public. Moreover, the
concept is not meant as a freestanding category of citizens. I am not claiming that
all citizens should or do adhere to the practices of distributed readiness. Even some
well-informed citizens today base their decisions on social loyalties (Achen & Bartels,
2016). What I am suggesting is that distributed readiness citizenship is a notion that
can work normatively to guide our descriptive and evaluative work.
This proposal has at least two implications for empirical analysis: one for how
we design studies of public connection and one for on whom and upon what we
decide to focus. First, attention to the public as a collective does not mean we
should make do with time-series survey data of public opinions (Page & Shapiro,
1992). If we have distributed readiness citizenship in mind when we approach the
question of how people in different settings connect with a public, then we should
ask different questions: we should aim to study uses across different media, or media
repertoires (Hasebrink & Domeyer, 2012), but we should also integrate analyses of
peoples’ practices and routines in everyday life in general, at home with family, at
work, at the mall, or on the golf course. It appears less relevant to quiz respondents
about political facts, and more relevant to figure out how certain journalistic media,
used on different platforms, mix with online social networking, and with voluntary
work, access to information and discussion in the workplace, and feelings of efficacy
towards issues of concern in the local community. Such an endeavor requires a combi-
nation of methods, but more importantly, it entails new answers as we pose different
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questions, since we are not basing our analysis on checking how well respondents
can recall facts, but mapping their experience and their abilities to mobilize a
network when faced with the need to get involved in politics. In that endeavor,
we can try to study how people evaluate new issues based on their existing beliefs
and prior judgments (e.g. Lodge et al., 1995). If knowledge is to be tested at all,
perhaps instead of probing respondents like students at an exam, we could have
informants tell us what they know through interviews, as suggested by Rapeli (2014).
A two-step methodological design can also be valuable, where qualitative interviews
identify issues—as well as important mechanisms and channels for informants’ public
connections—which, in the next step, are applied in a survey to test generalizability
(Hovden & Moe, 2017).
The second implication of turning towards a notion of distributed readiness
citizenship has to do with where we direct our attention. The concept is intended to
get us closer to actually existing practices, in order to understand why they fall short.
Shifting the focus when considering normative expectations does not mean anything
goes; the concept should be suitable for identifying obstacles faced by those less well-
off when they try to maintain their roles in democratic governance. For research, this
steers our attention away from early adopters and those with high interest in news.
Previous discussions of monitorial citizens and new news standards have tended to
concern the quality of news (Bennett, 2003; Zaller, 2003) or how the media can serve
those with clear political interests (Graber, 2003).
I suggest we look elsewhere. The news junkies and the politically engaged are doing
fine. We should be interested in the rest, including the majority that have little time to
spare for acquiring political knowledge, and those groups who, for different reasons,
appear at the periphery of society. What kind of resources do they need to strengthen
their public connection? Information shortcuts are necessary, so how can we make
them work better for those with sparse connections, and how can we make a structure
that minimizes the manipulation of those well-informed and those in power? How
do social networks and institutions, such as civil society groups or unions, matter,
and are they fulfilling their potential as nodes one can rely upon when the labor
is distributed? Building on the two-step research design outlined above to identify
and map components of people’s public connection, a third step would be to use
survey data to find those groups who struggle, and then spend time, perhaps through
ethnographic work, to figure out how, in different societies, those groups best can
be served in order to allow them to act as citizens. Facing populism, new forms of
propaganda, increased datafication, and withering social structures, this is where we
should direct our attention when we analyze and evaluate the state of democracies.
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